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SECURITY INTERESTS IN MOTOR VEHICLES: A
CONFLICT IN KENTUCKY LAW
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is "intended to be
a comprehensive treatment of the entire field"2 of commercial
law and its adoption represents a state's decision to join with
other states to bring uniformity to this area of the law. This
uniformity is attained by having one body of law control all
commercial law problems for all states.3 To encourage uniform-
ity and to prevent arguably inconsistent state laws from inter-
fering with the uniform application of the Code, Kentucky's
highest court has adopted the rule of construction that the
Code is "plenary and exclusive except where the legislature has
clearly indicated otherwise." 4
However, in the area of motor vehicle security interests,
Kentucky has encountered problems integrating extra-Code
law with certain provisions of the Code. Difficulties arise from
the relationship between UCC § 9-302, UCC § 9-103(4), and
Kentucky's motor vehicle registration law.
Under the Code, security interests in property for which
state law requires a certificate of title reflecting all liens on that
property are exempted from the filing requirements of UCC §
9-302(1) for perfection.' Kentucky has such a statute,7 but has
The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] was adopted by the
1958 Kentucky General Assembly, 1958 Ky. Acts, ch. 77, and is codified as Chapter
355 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter cited as KRS]. Since the ten
articles of the Code are assigned section numbers 355.1-101 through 355.10-102 inclu-
sive, citations in this comment are made to the UCC section only, omitting the KRS
prefix. Furthermore, all references to the Code, unless otherwise indicated, are to the
1962 version as adopted in Kentucky.
2 Whiteside & Lewis, Kentucky's Commercial Code-Some Initial Problems in
Security, 50 Ky. L.J. 61, 67 (1961).
See UCC § 1-102(2)(c). It should be noted that although an overwhelming objec-
tive of the UCC is uniformity in the commercial laws of the various states, the drafts-
men were cognizant of the important supplemental role to be played by "the principles
of law and equity" of each adopting state. See UCC § 1-103.
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1961).
See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d 894 (Ky.
1972); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961); Fitzgerald,
The Crazy Quilt of Commercial Law: A Study in Legislative Patchwork, 54 KY. L.J.
85 (1965).
UCC § 9-302(3)(b). See note 13 infra for the text of this section.
KRS § 186.045 (Supp. 1976). The pertinent text of the statute is:
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not exempted property within the statute's scope from the
Code's filing requirements.8 Instead, the Supreme Court and
the legislature have effectively required both filing and the
notation of liens on the certificate of title.9 The cases0 and the
statute" make it unclear whether the notation of liens on the
certificate of title is a condition necessary in order to perfect a
security interest in a motor vehicle. This is significant not only
for intrastate priority interests, but for the special conflicts of
law rule provided by the Code. The perfection of security inter-
ests in property for which a security interest must be noted on
a certificate of title is determined by the law of the state which
issued the certificate:
If personal property is covered by a certificate of title issued
under a statute of this state or any other jurisdiction which
requires indication on a certificate of title of any security
(1) Financing statements relating to vehicles required to be registered
in Kentucky by the county clerk shall be filed in the office of the county clerk
of the county in which the debtor resides, or, if the debtor is a nonresident,
in the office of the county clerk in which the vehicle is principally operated.
(2)(a) Whenever a financing statement required by KRS chapter 355
relating to any vehicle registered or required to be registered in Kentucky for
use on the highway is presented to a county clerk for filing, such clerk shall
also immediately note information required by the department relative
thereto on the owner's copy of the registration or transfer receipt issued for
the current registration period as noted in subsection (2) of KRS 186.170,
which the secured party must obtain and present to the county clerk, along
with the financing statement, within ten (10) days after execution of the
security agreement. The Clerk shall also note such information on the clerk's
copy of the registration or transfer receipt maintained in his office in numeri-
cal order. The clerk noting the information on the owner's copy of the regis-
tration or transfer receipt shall return such receipt to the owner within five
(5) days after making such notation ....
(3) For failure to present both the current receipt and financing state-
ment within the time prescribed by subsection (2) (a), the secured party shall
pay a penalty of two dollars ($2.00) to the county clerk as a prerequisite for
noting the security interest on the current receipt. The penalty, less the
county clerk's commission of five per cent (5%), shall be remitted to the
department.
s Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
Id. See also 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 84, § 5(3) (amending KRS § 186.045(3)) in which
the penalty for failure to present the registration receipt for filing was increased from
a $2.00 fine to a prohibition against ever perfecting by filing.
11 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1972); Lincoln
Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
11 KRS § 186.045, as amended by 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 84, § 5.
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interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the
perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which
issued the certificate.'
2
Whether Kentucky requires notation of liens "as a condition of
perfection" is important in determining whether Kentucky law
will govern a potential priority contest in which the choice of
law can make a difference in outcome. The state of confusion
in this area of commercial law indicates a need for re-
evaluation of motor vehicle security interests.
I. THE RATIONALE OF UCC § 9-302
UCC § 9-302' attempts to "integrate" Article 9 with each
state's certificate of title act." The Code draftsmen added this
provision after plans were abandoned to include a uniform cer-
tificate of title provision within the Code.1 5 The purpose of UCC
§ 9-302(3)(b) is to exempt from the Code's filing requirements
property subject to a state statute which provides an adequate
system for perfecting security interests by notation on a certifi-
cate of title.'" This exemption is intended to prevent conflicts
which might otherwise arise if both the state statute and the
Code provided perfection requirements for the same property.'7
If UCC § 9-302(4) is to have any significance, certificate of title
acts should provide the exclusive means for perfecting security
interests in motor vehicles in those states having such acts.' 8
" UCC § 9-103(4).
13 As adopted in Kentucky, UCC § 9-302 states in relevant part:
(3) The filing provisions of this article do not apply to a security interest
in property subject to a statute:
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires
indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property.
(4) A security interest in property covered by a statute described in
subsection (3) can be perfected only by registration or filing under that
statute or by indication of the security interest on a certificate of title or a
duplicate thereof by a public official.
4 1 G. GILMORE, SEcuRIr INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 572-78 (1965).
, 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 572-73.
" See UCC § 9-320, Comment 8 (1962 Official Text). UCC § 9-302(6) alternative
A (Kentucky's version) exempts property for which notation is required. Alternative
B exempts property for which notation "may" be indicated. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note
14, at 572.
" See UCC § 9-302(4).
28 Whiteside and Lewis, supra note 2, at 73; 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 573-
[Vol. 66
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Because the draftsmen contemplated title acts which pro-
vide for "the exclusive method of perfecting a security interest
in a motor vehicle,"' 9 the fact that many states have statutes
which do not provide the exclusive means of perfection causes
difficulty in applying UCC § 9-302.2o The various states can be
divided into three groups: filing states, exclusive title states,
and non-exclusive title states.2' Filing states are those without
any type of certificate of title law; there is no notation require-
ment and perfection is accomplished by filing.22 An exclusive
certificate of title state requires the notation of liens as the
exclusive method of perfection.23 Non-exclusive title states
either permit or require the notation of liens, but the notation
does not alone constitute perfection. Perfection is accom-
plished in such jurisdictions by either filing alone or by both
filing and notation.2 4 The primary difficulty lies with non-
exclusive title states. The question is whether notation is either
"required" so as to be exempt from Article 9 filing require-
ments or is a "condition of perfection"26 for the preference given
in 9-103(4) in choice-of-law questions.
II. KENTUCKY'S MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION
ACT AND UCC § 9-302
A significant question which arises from the foregoing dis-
cussion is whether Kentucky's Vehicle Registration Act re-
quires notation of liens on the certification of title as a
"condition of perfection." The present Kentucky statute per-
" 1 G. Gn.MoRE, supra note 14, at 573.
" See Ward, Interstate Perfection of the Motor Vehicle Security Interest: A Bot-
tleneck in Section 9-103, 34 ALB. L. REv. 251, 257-65 (1970).
2, 1 G. GILMOrE, supra note 14, at 553. Comment, The California Used Car Dealer
and the Foreign Lien-A Study in the Conflict of Laws, 47 CALF. L. Rxv. 543, 546-48
app. A-D. See also Ward, supra note 20, at 257-64 for a detailed analysis of the different
certificate of title acts adopted by various states.
" 1 G. GmmRoE, supra note 14, at 553; Comment, supra note 21, at 547-48.
'" 1 G. GILmoRE, supra note 14, at 553; Comment, supra note 21, at 546-47.
24 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 553; Comment, supra note 21, at 547.
" UCC § 9-302(3)(b) exempts security interests from the Code's filing require-
ments for property subject to a statute "which requires" notation of liens.
" UCC § 9-103(4) provides that perfection of security interests in property covered
by a statute which requires notation "as a condition of perfection" is governed by the
"law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate."
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taining to the creation of security interests in motor vehicles2'
was enacted after repeal of a similar statute2l which had been
enacted "to effect the benefits of the so-called motor vehicle
'certificate of title' laws. . without removing the fee business
from the county clerks."29 The legislative intention to have the
former statute function as a certificate of title act was partially
frustrated in its first judicial test. The Court stated in Lincoln
Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan:
[I]t is our opinion that although it is the filing of the financ-
ing statement that perfects the interest of the secured credi-
tor, independently of the execution by the various parties and
county clerks of their duties under KRS 186.195, the county
clerk may refuse to record a financing statement in the ab-
sence of compliance with KRS 186.195.1
Thus the Court effectively required both filing and the notation
of liens on the registration receipt.3' Although filing was the
condition that perfected the security interest, the county clerk
could require notation by refusing to file a statement that did
not comply with the registration receipt statute.
Given the dual requirements placed on the secured party,
it seemed unlikely that a security interest would ever be filed
and not noted on the registration. However, Professors White-
side and Lewis envisioned two situations in which this might
occur.32  One situation hypothesized was an after-acquired
property clause covering equipment and a motor vehicle cov-
ered by such a clause. It is probable that the security interest
would not be reflected on the registration receipt. The other
situation anticipated neglect by a county clerk. Professors
Whiteside and Lewis predicted that the secured party who filed
would be protected. 3 The opposite result was reached in
General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hodge,3" a case in-
" KRS § 186.045 (Supp. 1976). See note 7, supra, for the relevant text of that
statute.
Is KRS § 186.195 (repealed by 1964 Ky. Acts, ch. 59 § 6).
21 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Ky. 1961).
3 Id. at 387.
3, Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 2, at 74-75; Whiteside, Amending the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 Ky. L.J. 3, 10 (1962). Professor Whiteside felt that the legislature
codified the result in Queenan by amending § 186.195 in 1962. Id. at 11, 15.
32 Whiteside & Lewis, supra note 2, at 74 n.52.
3 Id.
- 485 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1972). Although the Hodge Court was interpreting a differ-
[Vol. 66
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volving a clerk's neglect. In Hodge, a secured party filed a
financing statement and noted the lien on the first registration
receipt as required by the new statute. But in subsequent
transfers and reregistration, the county clerk inadvertently
failed to indicate the secured party's lien. Eventually, after
numerous other transfers, the debtor defaulted and the secured
party sought to repossess the vehicle from the subsequent pur-
chaser. 5
At first glance, the facts of Hodge appear to set up a typi-
cal Code priority contest. The secured party believed this to be
the case and framed its argument in terms of a priority conflict
between a perfected secured party and a subsequent pur-
chaser.38 However, the Court did not consider the questions of
perfection and priority. Instead, the Court framed the issue as
follows:
We are, therefore, squarely faced with the question of whom
should the law protect - the purchaser without notice or the
lien holder, when the Act requires the Clerk to place the
notice of the lien on the registration receipt and does not
provide for the legal consequences when he fails to do so? 7
ent statute from that interpreted in the Queenan case, the two statutes were nearly
identical with respect to the requirement regarding notation of liens. Compare 1958
Ky. Acts, ch. 82, § 4(2) (codified as KRS § 186.195, this was the statute interpreted in
the Queenan case) with KRS § 186.045(2)(a) (the statute involved in the Hodge case).
The Hodge Court saw the new statute as intending "to permit the transfer of automo-
biles with complete reliance upon the registration receipt as to any liens thereon." 485
S.W.2d at 896. The Court expressed doubt about whether this goal had been reached.
Id. It seems likely that the legislature had simply made the filing and notation require-
ments more explicit, without actually changing the legal effect of notation or lack
thereof. Cf. Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 87.
' 485 S.W.2d at 895.
3 Brief for Appellant at 10, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485
S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1971):
Kentucky is not a "CERTIFICATE OF TITLE" state and conflicting inter-
ests in motor vehicles are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code....
In Lincoln Bank & Trust Company v. Queenan, .. . the Court ... noted
that KRS 186.195, which with certain changes is now KRS 186.045, comple-
ments the recording provisions of the Commercial Code. The Court noted
... that a prospective buyer or lender has two sources of protective notice
to one of which he may be easier assessed than to the other. However, the
Court went on to note that it was the filing of the financing statement that
perfects the interest of the creditor, independently of the execution by the
various parties and county clerks of their duties under KRS 186.195 which
is now KRS 186.045.
' 485 S.W.2d at 896.
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The Court's decision to protect the "purchaser without notice"
rather than the secured party38 added confusion to the require-
ments for perfecting security interests in motor vehicles. The
holding in Hodge implicitly overruled Lincoln Bank insofar as
Lincoln Bank held that a security interest was perfected by the
filing of a financing statement. Furthermore, Hodge conflicted
with an earlier case which held that the filing of a financing
statement constituted constructive notice.31 Since the appellee
in Hodge was portrayed as a purchaser without notice, the
Court clearly did not consider the filing of a financing state-
ment sufficient under these facts to constitute notice.
Perhaps the most serious fault of the decision in Hodge
was its failure to resolve the issue of whether motor vehicle
security interests are perfected by Code filing alone or whether
the notation of liens on the registration receipt is also required.
Had the Court decided whether the secured party was per-
fected or unperfected, there would have been little difficulty in
applying the Code's priority provisions to determine the par-
ties' rights in the collateral. Unfortunately, the Court disre-
garded the Code and'avoided the opportunity to clarify the law
as to motor vehicle security interests.
Because of the vague and inconsistent reasoning of the
Hodge case, its precedential value is uncertain. The Court
noted that the legislature had amended the vehicle registration
statute but that the amendment had not "succeeded in over-
ruling the Lincoln Bank case or in assuring subsequent credi-
tors that they can rely on the registration receipt."" But even
though the Court expressed uncertainty as to whether a pur-
chaser could rely on the requirement for notation of liens, a
purchaser whose only defense was that no lien was noted on
the registration paper was protected. Obviously, the Court
placed great significance on the absence of the lien notation on
the certificate of registration.
" Id. at 896-97.
3, Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964).
,0 485 S.W.2d at 896 (quoting Fitzgerald, supra note 5).
[Vol. 66
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II. PROBLEMS IN APPLYING UCC § 9-103
IN CONJUNCTION WITH UCC § 9-302
Section 9-1034l is another Code provision which creates
problems because of its interrelationship with Kentucky's Ve-
hicle Registration Act.4 2 This section was drafted to make the
Code conflicts of law rules applicable where justified under
general conflicts of law principles.4 3 Specifically, UCC § 9-
103(4) was added to avoid the necessity of duplicating perfec-
tion" and to provide the secured party with extensive protec-
tion if the security interest is perfected by notation on a certifi-
cate of title." The Code nonetheless manifests a definite prefer-
ence for certificate of title states which can be demonstrated
by analysis of the following fact situations.
A. Non-Title State v. Title State Conflicts
If a motor vehicle security interest is perfected in a non-
title state and the subject property is removed to a title state,
the issuance of a certificate by the title state would generally
trigger the application of § 9-103(4). In that instance, the title
state's law would then determine the requirements for perfec-
tion, 6 resulting in priority for the party who perfects by nota-
" See text accompanying note 12 supra for the relevant text of § 9-103(4).
42 For discussion of UCC § 9-103 and attendant problems, see generally Furnish,
Multistate Security Interests in Automobiles Under UCC Section 9-103, ARiz. ST. L.J.
293 (1975); Rohner, Autos, Title Certificates and UCC 9-103: The Draftsmen Try
Again 27 Bus. LAw. 1177, 1183 (1972); Weintraub, Choice of Law in Secured Personal
Property Transactions: The Impact of Article 9 on the Uniform Commercial Code, 68
MICH. L. REv. 683 (1968); Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate
of Title Acts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 610 (1968); Note,
Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles Subject to Security Interests: A Case for Re-
pealing UCC § 9-103(4), 54 CORNELL L. REv. 610 (1968); Comment, Section 9-103 and
the Interstate Movement of Goods, 9 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REv. 72 (1968); Com-
ment, Uniform Commercial Code-Perfection of Security Interests in Multi-State
Transactions When Property is Covered by a Certificate of Title, 47 B.U.L. REV. 430
(1967).
4 REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PERMANENT
EDrrORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 229-30 (1971). See
generally Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(Part 1) 26 Bus. LAw. 1465 (1971); (Part 2) 27 Bus. LAw 321 (1971).
" Rohner, supra note 42, at 1183.
" See text accompanying notes 46-54 infra for discussion of this protectidn.
" Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 933
(Tex. 1971). See also Ward, supra note 20, at 268-69; Note, Uniform Commercial Code,
50 TEX. L. Rxv. 423 (1972). See generally Note, Dealers Beware: A New Section 9-103
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tion even though much later in time than the filing. However,
some courts hold that § 9-103(4) does not apply when a vehicle
is removed from a non-title state to a title state." These courts
apply § 9-103(3) and the secured party in the non-title state
remains perfected for four months.48
B. Title State v. Non-Title State Conflicts
The Code's preference for certificate of title states is also
demonstrated when a motor vehicle security interest is per-
fected in a title state and removed to a non-title state. In this
situation, the interest perfected in the title state continues in
the non-title state until it expires in the issuing state."
C. Title State v. Title State Conflicts
Motor vehicle security interests perfected in a certificate
of title state and removed to another certificate of title state
will not ordinarily create any problems. In the typical case, the
first certificate will be surrendered and any lien noted thereon
will be transferred to the new certificate."0 Occasionally
though, through either fraud5' or administrative error, multiple
certificates may exist covering the same vehicle. In this situa-
tion, most writers agree that the 1962 Code has no express
For Texas, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 275 (1974). This is the view adopted in the 1972 Code
with respect to buyers "not in the business of selling goods of that kind . . . and
without knowledge of the security interest." UCC § 9-103(2)(c)-(d) (1972 version).
Persons not in this category have four months to perfect in the second state. Id. at 9-
103 (1)(d).
" First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 225 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966); Note,
Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, supra note 42, at 385; Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-
Perfection of Security Interests in Multi-State Transactions when Property is Covered
by a Certificate of Title, supra note 42.
" Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 42, at 382-84.
1' In re White, 266 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.N.Y. 1967); Rohner, supra note 42, at 1178
n.42; Ward, supra note 20, at 269. The 1972 Code provides for a similar result if there
has not been a surrender of the certificate or reregistration in the second state. UCC §
9-103(2)(b) and comment 4(c) (1972 version).
10 Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 42, at 394; 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 623.
"1 See Furnish, supra note 42, at 301; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF TE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 861 (1972); Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien
Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 PA. L. Rxv. 455 (1948); 1 G. GILMORE, supra note
14, at 623.
[Vol. 66
197-78]COMMENTS
application. 2 But in reading the title acts together with § 9-
103, it becomes apparent that the Code envisioned having only
one certificate covering a motor vehicle.5 3 Whether or not a
second clean certificate is the result of fraud or administrative
error, the courts generally favor the later issued certificate. 4
D. UCC § 9-103(4) in Kentucky
Construction of Kentucky's motor vehicle law so that the
notation of liens is a condition of perfection would qualify a
security interest perfected in Kentucky for preferential treat-
ment under § 9-103(4). This preferential treatment results from
the application of Kentucky law to protect security interests
perfected in Kentucky. However, the application of UCC § 9-
103(4) presents a problem because it must be read together
with UCC § 9-302 to determine whether the state's certificate
of title law requires the notation of liens as a condition of
perfection. Since Kentucky is not an "exclusive" certificate of
title state, notation may not be a condition of perfection and
security interests perfected in Kentucky, even though the liens
are noted, may not qualify for the preference of § 9-103(4).
Since Lincoln Bank held that the notation of liens was not a
"condition of perfection" and the validity of Lincoln Bank was
undermined by Hodge, there is uncertainty as to what the con-
ditions are for perfection of motor vehicle security interests in
Kentucky.
IV. A POSSMLE RESOLUTION
As indicated by the preceding sections, UCC § 9-302 ex-
empts from the Code's filing requirements property in which a
security interest can be perfected by the notation of liens on the
certificate of title. In effect, to apply UCC § 9-302, the courts
12 Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 42, at 393. See 1 G. GmmoRE, supra note 14,
at 623.
0 Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 42, at 393; In re Edwards, 6 UCC REP. SERv.
1124 (E.D. Mich. 1969); In re Schoeller, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 1093 (D. Conn. 1968).
" Furnish, supra note 42, at301. The 1972 code provides protection for the original
secured party if multiple certificates exist. UCC §9-102(2)(b) and comment 4(c). How-
ever, this protection is not provided for secured parties if there are subsequent buyers
who rely on a "clean" certificate. UCC § 9-103(2)(b), (d) and comment 4(c)-(d).
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must look to the state's title law to see if it requires the notation
of liens as a condition of perfection.
This determination will indicate whether secured parties
in Kentucky can claim the benefit of UCC § 9-103(4). 5 Much
of Kentucky's problem in interpretation of its title law stems
from the Court's decision in Lincoln Bank. As Judge Palmore
noted, the Court faced a "treacherous" question." The problem
confronted by the Court was twofold: construe UCC § 9-302
and the Kentucky motor vehicle registration statute so as to
require the notation of liens on the registration receipt and at
the same time define the requirements for perfection in such a
way as to protect the clerks' filing fee business57 by not exempt-
ing motor vehicles from the Code's filing requirements.
To resolve this dilemma, the Court held that the notation
of liens on a certificate of title was not required to perfect a
security interest; therefore, the UCC § 9-302 exemption from
filing did not apply. However, the Court added that the clerk
could refuse to file a financing statement unless the lien was
noted on the registration receipt.58 Most significantly, the
Court held the perfection was accomplished independently of
the notation.59
Unfortunately, the Court's ingenuity in Lincoln Bank has
proved to be inadequate. The decision did avoid exempting
motor vehicles from the Code's filing requirements and did give
some bite to the notation requirement of the registration stat-
ute, but it failed to resolve what effect the absence of a notation
has on a filed financing statement.
The problem left ionanswered by the Court in Lincoln
Bank arose later in Hodge. In that case, the Court confronted
the problem of protecting a purchaser's reliance on a registra-
-1 Compare J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 51, at 856 n.198, with Ward, supra
note 20, at 258, and Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles Subject to Security
Interests: A Case for Repealing UCC 9-103(4), supra note 42, at 613-14 n.12. These
commentators disagree as to whether Kentucky is a certificate of title state. Signifi-
cantly, none has considered the registration statute in light of the judicial construction
given it by the Kentucky Court. Professor Gilmore concluded that Kentucky required
both filing and notation. 1 G. GiLMORE, supra note 14, at 574 n.2. Ward, supra note
20, concluded that Kentucky qualifies for protection under § 9-103(4). Id. at 258.
" 344 S.W.2d at 386.
57 Id.
" Id. at 387.
51 Id.
[Vol. 66
COMMENTS
tion receipt whereon no lien was noted, although a financing
statement had been filed which indicated a security interest in
the automobile. However, the Court did not decide the issue
under Article 9 because, applying the reasoning of Lincoln
Bank, filing would have perfected the security interest and the
absence of notation would have been of no significance. In ef-
fect, the Court was forced to abandon the Code in order to
protect the purchaser, thus creating confusion.
Moreover, Lincoln Bank set out perfection requirements
that discouraged reliance on the registration receipt. When the
Hodge Court was confronted with a purchaser who had relied
on the registration receipt, it avoided the opportunity to define
the requirements for perfection of security interests in motor
vehicles and created doubt as to the continuing validity of
Lincoln Bank's requirements for perfection. The end result is
confusion in the case law concerning motor vehicle security
interests.
If the Court in Lincoln Bank had so desired, it could have
interpreted UCC § 9-302 and the Kentucky title statute so as
to avoid this problem. Subsection 9-302(3)(b) exempts from
the Code's filing requirements property perfected under those
statutes which require the indication of liens on the certificate
of title. It is certainly clear that both KRS § 186.045 and its
predecessor, KRS § 186.195, were intended to require the nota-
tion of liens on the registration receipt. Consequently, property
covered by these statutes should have been exempted from the
Code's filing requirements under § 9-302(3)(b).
This does not mean that there cannot also be a filing re-
quirement." Since the Kentucky statute clearly calls for filing
in addition to the notation, KRS § 355.9-302(4) should be
amended to require both notation and filing as required by
KRS § 186.045. 61 An alternate solution would be a judicial in-
commentators have favored the abolition of the filing requirement and adop-
tion of an exclusive certificate of title law. Whiteside, supra note 31, at 12; Whiteside
& Lewis, supra note 2, at 76; Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 90.
11 Suggested amendment to KRS § 355.9-302 based on MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
440-9302 (Supp. 1977):
(3) The filing provisions of this article do not apply to a security interest in
property subject to a statute
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of security interests in such
property, or a vehicle which is not inventory held for a sale for which a
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terpretation explicitly accepting the same result. This con-
struction of UCC § 9-302 would clearly require notation as a
condition of perfection. Kentucky would then be entitled to
those benefits the Code provides for certificate to title states
under UCC § 9-103.
Recent attempts by the Kentucky General Assembly to
coerce secured parties to file do little to clear the confusion
which surrounds the application of UCC § 9-103. The 1978
legislature amended Kentucky's motor vehicle law, KRS §
186.045, by increasing the penalty for failure of the secured
party to present the financing statement within the prescribed
time limit for violation."2 The penalty prior to the amendment
had been a two dollar fine. Under the amendment, a late-filing
party "shall not be allowed thereafter to file the financing
statement in order to perfect the security interest thereon.
'63
This amendment, by stronger implication than Lincoln Bank,
makes filing and notation required in Kentucky. However, not
only is this a heavy-handed way to coerce filing, it is doubtful
whether such a limitation can be put on perfection. 4 The at-
tempted effect of this amendment-requiring both notation
and filing-could be achieved by a proper amendment to KRS
§ 355.9-302.65 Such an amendment would not only protect sub-
registration receipt is required under the provisions of KRS § 186.040.
(4) A security interest in property covered by a statute described in subsec-
tion (3) can be perfected only by registration or filing under that statute:
except that in the case of a security interest in a vehicle which is not inven-
tory held for sale or referred to in subsection (3) or an accessory as referred
to therein, the filing required to perfect such security interest is the filing of
a financing statement with the local clerk as provided in KRS § 186.045.
The above suggested amendment makes it clear that both filing and notation are
required to perfect a security interest in a motor vehicle. KRS § 186.045 could be
amended to reflect that filing is no longer required under § .9-302, but under § 186.045.
62 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 84, § 5(3) (amending KRS § 186.045(3)). Kentucky's registra-
tion statute has been criticized for its lack of sanction for noncompliance. Whiteside
& Lewis, supra note 2, at 75, Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 87.
1978 Ky. Acts. ch. 84, § 5(3) (amending KRS § 186.045(3)).
, See 78 Ky. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 423, stating that such an amendment "supplants the
Code" and is "a mistake which is not truly indicative of the legislative intent." The
effect of this amendment may become clear once a decision is reached in Hardin
County Fiscal Court v. Logsdon, No. 78-CI-553 (Hardin Circuit Court, filed Aug. 2,
1978). In this petition for declaratory judgment the Hardin County Fiscal Court and
the Hardin County Court Clerk are asking for a judicial construction of the new
amendment.
" See note 61 supra for a proposed amendment.
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sequent purchasers but would make clear the application of
UCC 9-103(4) to Kentucky motor vehicle security interests.
Henry Lawson
